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MAKING SENSE OF 'PUBLIC' EMERGENCIES
Frarn;ois Tanguay-Renaud•

Emergencies are situations, often unforeseen, in which there is a risk of
significant harm and a need to act urgently if the harm is to be averted or
minimised. We encounter emergencies throughout our lives, and often
allow them to shape our behaviour. Who has never sought to account for
resorting to an unusual degree of force, failing to fulfill a promise,
crossing a red light, or for any other sort of prima facie wrong doing by
citing an emergency? Some theorists and policy-makers believe that there
exists a special category of emergencies that pose distinctly greater
challenges than others, and merit an independent focus. They tend to
single them out as 'public emergencies.'
Given the widespread and sometimes inconsistent uses of the
category, I first ask in this article whether there really are emergencies that
are so distinctive as to warrant resort to a specific 'public' designation. I
argue that there are distinctively 'public' emergencies and that the label,
although vague, helps bring out important contrasts. By virtue of their role
and position in the world, governments must often contend with additional
moral considerations that do not apply to ordinary agents, or do not apply
in the same ways. Thus, whenever a government is responsible for
handling an emergency, additional considerations come into play and
affect the justifiability of what it might do in response. 'Public
emergencies,' I shall argue, are emergencies that interfere with a
government's performance of its role(s). As a result, such emergencies
may have distinctive moral implications. That being said, my purpose in
this article goes beyond mere definitional aims. I also want to demystify
some popular and theoretical (mis)conceptions about public emergencies.
Most notably, I want to confront and disentangle a number of conflicting
claims that morality may be more demanding, relaxed, or altogether
different in relation to public emergencies. While so doing, I want to

* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This is the
penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Philosophy of Management (fom1erly Reason
in Practice). I wish to thank Kimberley Brownlee, Alon Harel, Elizabeth Angell, Rahul
Rao, and, most importantly, John Gardner for discussion, comments, and criticism.
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emphasise the heterogeneity of the category, and argue that different
public emergencies may have widely differing characteristics and
implications. Although the writings of moral and political theorists Tom
Sorell and Michael Walzer constitute my principal foil in the article, I
address the works of various other commentators along the way. I
conclude with a few remarks on the importance of formal declarations to
the justifiability of some governmental responses to public emergencies.
These considerations set the stage for further study of the relationship
between public emergencies and the rule of law as an ethic of governance.

I. THE 'PUBLIC' CHARACTER OF EMERGENCIES: A
FEW NOTES ON METHODOLOGY
Can an independent inquiry into the idea of 'public emergencies' teach us
anything important about emergencies? Before entering the thick of the
argument, I believe that a few methodological caveats about the use of the
label 'public' are in order. First, it is important to note that the label can be
misleading. According to the Oxford English D;ctionmy, the word may
qualify that which 'belongs to, affects, or concerns the community or
nation.' 1 In this sense, academic and policy designations of wide-scale or
collectively-threatening emergencies as 'public' seem at least minimally
fitting. Yet, as the editors of the OED are keen to add in a caveat: 'The
varieties of sense [of the word 'public'] are numerous and pass into each
other by many intermediate shades of meaning. The exact shade often
depends upon the substantive qualified, and in some expressions more
than one sense is vaguely present'. In other words, the public-private
distinction is notoriously multifaceted. Depending on the purpose for
which it is used, it may reveal different aspects of reality while masking
others: state/non-state, public good or private property, private home and
public street, and so forth. The designation of an emergency as 'public'
does not escape the complexity and confusion inherent in the distinction.
For example, on the basis of the definition introduced at the beginning of
this paragraph, even a discrete individual emergency could meet the
1

'public, a. (n.)' in Oxford English Dictionary Online 2nd ed Oxford, Oxford University
Press
1989,
online:
<http://dictionary.oed.
corn/cgi/findword? query_type=word&que1yword=public>.
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'public' threshold, to the extent that it is a kind of emergency that should
concern not just the affected individuals but their fellow-citizensconsider murderous assaults or rape attempts.
If significant emergencies involve a risk of serious harm, and
serious harm is by and large a proper matter of public concern, then a
fairly wide assortment of significant emergencies may be said to be public.
Admittedly, limits such as those set by the 'harm principle' may be
invoked to restrict the legitimate scope of public concern. Depending on
how these limits are articulated, the range of public emergencies properly
2
called as such may vary. Yet more often than not, commentators who
invoke the label 'public emergency' are not considering discrete individual
emergencies. They speak instead of emergencies that are so significant as
to constitute potential justifications for emergency measures, states of
emergency, martial law, and the like. They want to talk about emergencies
that governments, law, and sometimes even morality, may not be able to
address in a normal manner, if at all. Therefore, their analyses tend to
distinguish between relatively isolated individual emergencies and what
they term 'public emergencies.' For example, Tom Sorell writes that:

There are imp01iant differences between, on the one hand, public
emergencies-emergencies facing whole states or large number of
people, and which are usually the responsibility of public agencies
and their officials-and, on the other hand, emergencies
confronting individuals in a private capacity. 3
Sorell then goes on to focus on 'the more extreme' and 'general'
emergencies-his examples include a 'state of all-out war' and of a
'violent civil war involving genocide' 4-as paradigmatic public
emergencies against which we should contrast private emergencies. 5
Sorell's tendency to assimilate public emergencies with worst-case
scenarios may be explained by his ultimate aim, which is to provide an
2

Compare the various positions smveyed in John Stanton-Ife 'The Limits of Law' in: E.
Zalta (ed) The Stm!ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), online:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/ entries/law-limits/>.
3
Tom Sorell 'Morality and Emergency' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103
(2002) pp 21-37 at p 22.
4
Sorell (2002, pp 27, 31).
5
Sorell (2002, pp 26-27, 31-33, 36-37).
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account of the defensibility of exceptional powers that governments
sometimes employ to deal with especially severe emergencies. The move
is relatively unsurprising, given the common tendency to assume that
exceptional powers of this sort are most relevant in cases of emergencies
that pose grave threats to law, order, social norms and state institutions,
not to mention collective and moral survival. Yet, such a broad-brush use
of the public-private distinction threatens to obscure more subtle ways in
which some emergencies may present greater, or different, challenges for
state and law than those of discrete individual emergencies. Sorell's
approach may also obscure a more nuanced assessment of the types of
state powers and responses suitable to different types of emergencies.
To be fair, Sorell is not oblivious to such subtleties. For example,
he affirms that 'it makes a difference what is in the balance. The foot and
mouth emergency is not to be compared to the Second World War, and the
analogy between September 11 and Pearl Harbour is very strained in many
ways as well. ' 6 Notice some of the various distinctions at play in this
sentence. One of the central differences between the 2001 British footand-mouth emergency and the Second World War is quantitativeirrespective of any other contrasts the Second World War affected people
on a much wider scale, and put many more lives at stake. The attacks of
September 11 and Pearl Harbour cannot be so easily distinguished. Similar
numbers of people were killed and wounded, and the scope of the material
destruction was comparable in many ways. If a difference exists, it seems
to be much a qualitative one-for example, one attack included a civilian
target and was perpetrated by non-state actors, whereas the other was
aimed at a military base and was the act of a state. Upon close reading,
Sorell alludes to conceptual tools that could help make sense of these basic
distinctions. On the one hand, he repeatedly stresses the relationship
between considerations of scale and the 'public' character of
emergencies. 7 On the other, he emphasises that some emergencies
endanger matters that are already the inherent responsibility of
governmental agencies. For example, he argues that, even if there is no
'human disaster' involved, it seems legitimate for a government to take
necessary steps to ensure a country's survival. 8 'It even seems legitimate,'
6

Sorell (2002, p 35).
Sorell (2002, p 22, 26-27, 31, 35).
8
Sorell (2002, p 36-37).
7
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he adds, 'for the desirability of national survival to go without saying for
the corresponding national governments.' According to him, 'There are
attachments, like that of a government to a nation[ ... ] which confer special
responsibility'.
Unfortunately, Sorell fails to differentiate and delineate these
quantitative and qualitative dimensions and systematically discuss their
ramifications. Instead, he tends to conflate them. Remember that,
according to him, public emergencies are 'emergencies facing whole states
or large number of people, and which are usually the responsibility of
public agencies and their officials. ' 9 As I suggested above, this approach
obscures important nuances. It is true that some emergencies may be both
large-in-scale and the inherent responsibility of governmental agencies
and their officials. It might even be true that such emergencies place
unique demands on the polity. However, since these dimensions do not
necessarily go hand-in-hand in a given emergency, it seems
methodologically sounder to distinguish them.
A few more preliminary remarks are in order. As I already
mentioned, one of the main reasons for my interest in 'public
emergencies' is the abundance of theoretical and political claims that some
such emergencies warrant drastic and unusual responses from
governments and their representatives. Yet cautionary tales are almost as
abundant. For example, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, who focus
on violent emergencies threatening state governance, suggest that:
The vast scope of powers [conferred on or invoked by
governments in some public emergencies] and their ability to
interfere with fundamental individual rights and civil liberties and
to allow governmental regulation of virtually all aspects of human
activity-as well as the possibility of their abuse-emphasize the
pressing need for clearly defining the situations in which they may
be invoked. 10

9

Sorell (2002, p 22) [Emphasis added].

10

Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in
The01J1 and Practice Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006, pp 5-6.

6

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 No. 08

Paradoxically, Gross and Ni Aolain state their doubt that precise
definitions can ever exist. Admittedly, when discussed in abstracto, the
contours of emergencies that might justify different responses will
unavoidably be somewhat vague. However, I believe that, once fleshed
out, quantitative and qualitative parameters unveiled by a close reading of
Sorell's work may well reveal themselves as key grounds for assessing the
propriety of various governmental responses.
For the sake of clarity, let me emphasise that the law often insists
on the fulfilment of very specific criteria before a given 'emergency
measure' can be imposed. For example, Canada's Emergencies Act, 1988,
reserves the most draconian powers for what it deems to be the most
serious emergencies and authorises more limited measures for less serious
emergencies. At one extreme, the existence of a 'war emergency' (s 37)
grants the federal government a wide margin of discretion to make orders
or regulations that it 'believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary or
advisable for the dealing with the emergency' (s 40). At the other end of
the spectrum, a 'public welfare emergency' (s 5) caused by a large-scale
natural catastrophe, a pandemic, or an industrial accident, allows for a
relatively limited set of listed measures that must be closely tailored to the
nature of that emergency (s 8). So-called 'public order emergencies' and
'international emergencies,' which pose more serious, or differently
challenging, threats to the integrity of the Canadian state, its legal system,
and its normal provision of government, occupy a middle position and
allow for a number of more invasive and unusual measures (ss 19 and 30).
Note that legally-stated criteria for emergencies and the precise nature of
the powers and measures made possible by the fulfilment of these criteria
may conceivably be spelt out in even finer detail. 11 They may also be left
more broadly open, as in the case of the European Convention on Human
Rights which allows for derogations from many Convention rights in time
of 'war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.' 12
Such technical variations can be explained by the fact that the law, when it
borrows a moral concept like 'emergency,' may adjust or restrict its
II For example, the Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984 (Commonwealth of Australia) deals
specifically with emergencies related to the shortage, or likelihood of shortage, of liquid
petroleum, a liquid petroleum product, a liquid petrochemical, methanol or ethanol.
Iz Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) s 15(1).
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meaning to suit its va1ious purposes. However, this modus operandi
should not cause us to forget that responses to emergencies, legal or
otherwise, are ultimately answerable to morality. Legal definitions, like
other governmental claims, do not have the final word. The ultimate
grounds for assessing responses to emergencies are the characteristics of
these emergencies as they actually unfold in the world, in all their
complexities.
Therefore, prior to any investigation of what actual legal systems
say about emergencies, one must reflect upon what may cause some of
them to possess different, or greater, moral implications than others. This
is precisely what I intend to do in the sections ahead. While doing so, I
will strive to provide a more consistent, transparent, and, hopefully, useful
account of why and how the idea of 'publicness' may matter-an account
that is more explicit and nuanced than Sorell's, and perhaps less of a
hostage to the kind of responses whose defensibility it might serve to
appraise.

II. PUBLIC EMERGENCIES AND THE MORAL POSITION
OF GOVERNMENTS

A. GOVERNMENTS AS MORAL AGENTS

A sound understanding of why some emergencies may pose more radical,
or different, challenges than others to governments and law begins with
the realisation that governments are moral agents, and therefore have
moral responsibilities. Here, I follow Joseph Raz in distinguishing 'the
state, which is the political organization of society, its government, the
agent through which it acts, and the law, the vehicle through which much
of its power is exercised.' 13 Given the deep interconnections between these
notions, they are often used interchangeably. For example, legal and
political theory literature sometimes refers perfectly intelligibly to states as
moral agents. At times, I have myself been venially guilty of crisscrossing
13

Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom Oxford, Oxford University Press 1986, p 70.
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the distinctions suggested by Raz. However, to the extent that a more
rigorous approach may clarify my argument and allow for key distinctions,
I will endeavour to respect them.
Now, I do recognise that an understanding of governments as
moral agents is controversial. It is often argued that governments are
fictional entities, and that fictional entities are not agents. Actions can
perhaps be intelligibly imputed to fictions, the argument goes, but fictions
cannot act per se. While this article is not the place for a full-blown
metaphysical inquiry into the possibility of governmental agency, some
limited observations are nonetheless apposite. First, those who raise the
fiction objection tend to forget that, at least in principle, a human being
may govern a society all by herself. Louis XIV may have been
exaggerating when he (allegedly) replied 'L 'Etat, c'est moil' to those who
advocated national representative institutions and a separation of powers.
Yet, such a claim may not have seemed so fanciful if made by Orwell's
Big Brother, Chaplin's Great Dictator, or Lon Fuller's Rex. It might even
be harder to write off if voiced by the hands-on, all-powerful ruler of a
minute, sparsely populated island state. If living human beings are not
fictions and may be agents, and if, at least in principle, they can govern
alone, must not those who claim that governments can never be agents be
wrong?
Perhaps the fiction objection has more bite against our big and
multifaceted modern governments. After all, it is true that modem
governments tend to be institutionalised and multilayered, to manage
highly populated, territorially significant welfare states, and to depend for
so doing on the actions of countless politicians, civil servants, and
otherwise enlisted individuals. Given such features, is it not misleading to
refer to these governments as agents? As recent theoretical literature
points out, the elaborate corporate nature of modern governments does not
prevent genuine governmental agency. 14 All governments have a complex
normative framework-i.e. a constitution, written or unwritten-that
constitutes and divides labour between their various organs, lays out
principles of governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making and
14
See especially Philip Pettit 'Responsibility Incorporated' Ethics 117 (2007) pp 171201; Alexander Wendt Social The01y of International Politics Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 1999, pp 193-245.
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control mechanisms. By complying with this framework to a reasonable
extent (insofar as it provides for sufficient constraints against internal
inconsistencies), individual members allow their government qua
corporate entity to form judgments and exhibit attitudes as a coherent
whole, and to make reasonably consistent decisions on the evaluative
propositions that they present to it for consideration. Thus, governments
can arrange for things to be done, and be held responsible for them. This is
the assumption on which I will proceed, not only because I find it
persuasive, but because treating governments as moral agents provides an
unparalleled lens through which one can make sense of what it means,
generally speaking, to speak of some emergencies as 'public.'

B. CONTINGENTLY OR INHERENTLY PUBLIC EMERGENCIES?
1. CONTINGENTLY PUBLIC EMERGENCIES?

When confronted with an emergency, a government may be in a
distinctive moral position for a number of contingent and inherent reasons.
The contingent reasons include, though are not limited to, what Sorell
terms considerations of scale. When emergencies are large-in-scale,
governments and their officials are often better, and sometimes even
uniquely, situated to address them. Typically, governments have means
and resources that are unavailable to individuals or small groups, such as
extensive de facto authority, significant control over the use of force,
considerable economic power, and relevant expertise. Thus, when the
magnitude of an emergency makes it necessary, they tend to be able to
coordinate more effectively, distribute resources more efficiently, react
more forcefully, and fund and implement more accurate prediction and
prevention strategies. Individuals and non-governmental groups can play a
part in minimising emergency-related harm in such situations, emblematic
government agencies like the military and emergency services are often
able to create a much more efficient and significant impact. Conversely,
discrete individual emergencies or emergencies of a relatively small scale
are often best addressed by those in the predicament (or those who are
close to it), especially when they arise unforeseeably. Thus, even when a
government undertakes to protect personal homes against fire, it usually
refrains from hiring specialised fire monitors to alert the fire department in
case of emergency. As a general rule, this would be inefficient, if not
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counter-productive, since ordinary citizens are usually best placed to fulfil
this task. Consider also the case of the bystander who is the only person
able to provide ready assistance to a man being mugged on the street.
As intuitive as they may seem, these assessments of situational
competence are merely contingent. For example, the government of a poor
and weak state might not be in a position to tackle large-scale emergencies
effectively. A government that is usually able to address such emergencies
appropriately may also be unable to do so in a particular instance. When
this is the case, it may be best (at least some of the time) for individuals
and non-governmental groups to deal with the situation instead. Similarly,
whereas some people may be best-placed to tackle certain types of
individual emergencies on their own, others may not. So there are really
two sets of issues that Sorell ambiguously subsumes under the lone
heading of 'scale.' Of course, the characteristics of an emergency-its
scale, but also its harm potential, urgency, complexity, and so forth-will
generally determine the types of responses needed. However, the
appropriateness of a needed response may itself be influenced by the
capacity or competence of the potential responder(s). I will come back to
the broader relevance of this last point in the following sections. For the
moment, note only that one might choose to label as 'public' those
emergencies to which governments are best able to respond. But I have
serious doubts about the wisdom of using the label in such a contingent
way. On the one hand, such use unnecessarily obscures the possibility that
governmental and non-governmental agents may be equally well-situated
to respond to an emergency, or that they may be able to play
complementaiy roles. It also fails to account for another imp01iant sense in
which we deem some emergencies to be 'public,' that is to say, when it is
the government's inherent responsibility-or, some might prefer to say, its
inherent duty-to tackle them. Could this second application of the label
provide a sounder basis for classification?
2. THE GENERAL DUTY OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
The last question invites an investigation of when, if ever, it is a
government's duty-or obligation-to address an emergency. Having a
duty means having a reason to do (or not to do) something that is not
hostage to one's goals and is also a reason not to act for certain conflicting
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reasons. It seems to me that, like all agents, governments have general
moral duties related to emergency assistance and prevention.
Consider, for example, the general duty to rescue that is often said
to find its roots in the value of human solidarity. If such a duty exists, as I
believe it does, it binds all moral agents. Although, strictly speaking,
modem governments are not human agents (despite depending on their
human members to act) and may not be able to act in solidarity qua
humans, it still makes sense to claim that their duties find ultimate
explanation in human values such as solidarity. This reasoning falls in line
with the 'humanistic principle' that has been defined and defended by
Joseph Raz as 'the claim that the explanation and justification of the
goodness or badness of anything derives from its contribution, actual or
possible, to human life and its quality.' 15 This principle serves as an
important reminder that, although a government's worth is irreducible to
the value of the particular individuals that comprise it, that worth still
derives from its value for human beings. Governmental agency does not,
or so I will assume, have a moral value prior to, and independent of, its
value for humans-the opposite stance being rather reminiscent of fascist
thought.
Attempting to articulate the content of the general duty to rescue,
T.M. Scanlon affirms that 'If you are presented with a situation in which
you can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate
someone's dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate)
sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.' 16 Scanlon claims that no
one could reasonably disagree that moral agents have such a duty, and
save for some extreme libertarians, theorists tend to agree with him. There
are disagreements about the scope of the duty; for example, some merely
speak of a duty that 'stops at the brink of danger,' 17 or of 'easy rescues and
other acts of aid for persons in grave peril' that can be performed with
'minimal risk, cost, and inconvenience.' 18 However, most theorists agree
that one should be willing to face at least some danger, risk, cost,
15

Raz (1986, pp 194ff).
T.M. Scanlon Tflhat We Owe Each Other Cambridge, Belknap Press 2000, p 224.
17
A.M. Honore 'Law, Morals and Rescue' in: James M. Ratcliffe (ed) The Good
Samaritan and the Law pp 225-242 Gloucester, Peter Smith 1981, p 231.
18
H.M. Malm 'Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype' Law and Philosophy 19
(1999) pp 707-750 at p 707.
16
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inconvenience, or sacrifice to rescue people in grave peril. Note that, in
practice, the characteristics of possible rescuers will often influence the
contours of their duty. For example, a rescue that would have a light or
moderate cost if performed by a government could require a tremendous
sacrifice from an ordinary human agent. Whereas a government may only
have to sacrifice the temporary use of a few well-equipped coastguard
boats to rescue a sailor caught in a storm, an ill-equipped windsurfer could
lose her life. Therefore, following from the point made in the last section,
we could argue that the scope of an agent's duty to provide emergency
assistance varies according to capacity, competence, and other relevant
characteristics.
Yet we intuitively feel that governments should provide emergency
assistance beyond the threshold of mere inconvenience or even moderate
cost or sacrifice. We tend to think of governments as morally obligated to
do more. For example, many consider that the American government
owed it to the inhabitants of New Orleans to rescue them, by hook or by
crook, from the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.
After years of neglected maintenance of the levee system, inadequate
public education regarding the risk and severity of hurricanes in the
region, and inadequate planning and preparedness training across
jurisdictional levels, there was a sense in which the government was partly
responsible for causing the peril faced by its citizens. 19 Consequently,
many would argue that it was morally required to go out of its way to
minimise and remedy the ensuing harm. While I do not dispute that
causing an emergency may sometimes give rise to duties, I think that the
deeper assumption at work in the previous example is that the government
was inherently responsible for the implementation of the preventive
measures listed above. It was part of its job, or in common philosophical
parlance, part of its role. Therefore, critics assume, the government had
obligations above and beyond the generic and somewhat contingent
demands of human solidarity. I believe these claims are valid.

19

Some commentators even insisted on describing Hurricane Katrina as two major
disasters, one natural and the other man-made. E.g. L.K. Comfort 'Fragility in Disaster
Response: Hurricane Katrina, 29 August 2005' The Fon1111 3 (2005) Article I at p 5,
online: <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vo13/iss3/a1il/>. Although hyperbolic, this
description brings out starkly the significance of the government's responsibility.
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3. OF ROLES, LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS, AND INHERENTLY PUBLIC
EMERGENCIES

Roles and morality

The general idea that roles may come with special duties that are less or
not at all contingent on an agent's individual characteristics is fairly
uncontroversial. Like H.L.A. Hart, I understand the notion of role
expansively to include the moral position of those who make promises. 20
In modem societies, it is widely accepted that promisors acquire new
duties, and that these duties may be emergency-related. For example,
someone may promise to come to another's aid in certain perilous
circumstances and, thus, be under a duty to do so even if the risks involved
are high. People may also acquire more extensive duties to provide
emergency assistance by joining a profession that involves more extensive
responsibilities of this kind-consider the case of medical doctors,
firefighters, police officers, and lifeguards. In the words of Tony Honore,
'If the fireman, policeman, or life-saver risks life and limb to help the
imperiled, he deserves and receives praise, because there is an element of
self-sacrifice or even heroism in his conduct, though what he does is
clearly his duty. ' 21 Honore even suggests that people, such as experienced
mountaineers, who hold themselves out as ready to effect rescues may
incur additional duties by virtue of their claims. Furthermore, it is often
assumed that people may find themselves bound by more extensive duties
associated with roles that they have not necessarily chosen, such as
parenthood. Shouldn't parents sometimes have to risk their own safety for
the safety of their children to a greater extent than other people? I do not
dispute that the definition and specific moral implications of different
roles may vary from one society or culture to another. Nor do I take issue
with those who argue that the types of considerations that ground the more
stringent duties associated with various roles may differ from one to the
next. However, I believe that the idea that some roles involve more
20

Hart writes that 'If two friends, out on a mountaineering expedition, agree that one
shall look after the food and the other the maps, then the one is correctly said to be
responsible for the food, and the other for the maps, and I would classify this as a case of
role-responsibility.' H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy ofLaw Oxford, OUP Oxford 1968, p 212.
21
Honore (1981, p 230).
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stringent duties to provide emergency assistance-preventive, concurrent,
or ex post facto-holds at least part of the answer as to why we feel that
governments should do more than ordinary individuals in response to
certain emergencies. Simply put, I believe that the role of government is
more demanding. 22
Before saying anything more about governments, I want to further
discuss the concept of a role. Roles in the relevant sense are 'social,' in
that they are parts that agents may play in their relationships with others.
Specifically, they are parts with distinctive social functions or purposes. 23
To play a role is to relate to (one or many) other persons through a
relationship that imposes a configuration of normative expectationswhich may reflect duties, rights, powers and so forth-about how one
should behave. These expectations are generally a function of the social
purpose(s) of the role. In simpler terms, roles are ethics of how agents
ought to relate to others in given social contexts. Roles single out roleplaying agents for the application of various reasons, permissions, and so
on, which they emphasise, mould, and systematise. They simultaneously
afford these agents with exclusionary reasons not to act for (some or all)
conflicting reasons. Thus, some say that role-based ethics of action tend to
prioritise themselves. Of course, the matter is often more complicated:
agents tend to enter into a range of different relationships and play
multiple roles concurrently. In an ideal world, such roles would not
conflict, but in the real world, they often do. When that is the case, it is up
to the conflicted role-player to choose which ethic of action to follow. As
a rational and moral agent, the conflicted role-player should opt for a
rationally undefeated and morally acceptable ethic of action (of which
there might be more than one to choose from). But to add further
complexity, what if none of the conflicting role-based ethics constitutes
such an acceptable option?

22

It does not matter in any significant way for the purpose of my argument whether the
role of government is understood as a complex combination of different roles or a as a
single role with highly demanding and complex dimensions. I tend to think that there is
such a thing as the general role of government, but that a government qua agent may also
assume more specific roles, for example, by entering into private contracts. More
argument would be needed to establish this position, but I assume it here.
23
See generally R.S. Downie Roles and Values: An Introduction to Social Ethics London,
Methuen 1971, pp 121-128.
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At this point, it is important to appreciate that agents qua agentsnot qua role-players-are the basic units to which reason and morality
apply. To the extent that certain (or all) roles played by some agents
require them to act immorally, agents should refrain from playing them.
To the extent that some roles guide agents to act immorally, they are bad
roles; their exclusion of conflicting reasons for action is unjustified. Some
philosophers take the opposite stance and argue that role-playing
undermines the very idea of a basic unity of agency. For example,
Alasdair Macintyre maintains that role-playing disrupts the unity of an
agent's moral life because 'we are taught to think and feel' in terms of the
roles that we play, and not in terms of 'the unity of life' of the agent who
plays those roles. 24 According to him, our modem lives are partitioned
'into a variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of
behaviour,' which leads to a 'fragmentation of morality.' 25 However,
morality is not something that can be evaded or selectively partitioned. 26 It
may be so partitioned from the point of view of a given role, but a rolebased normative assessment remains just that, an assessment from a point
of view that may be defeated. Thus, roles do not shield agents either
wholly or partially from the reach of morality. On the contra1y, to the
extent that they are good (or justified) roles, they add considerations that
agents should take into account when determining how to behave. Were
Macintyre to tell the single mother who is also a firefighter, a homeowner,
a committed friend, a soup kitchen volunteer, and her ailing mother's sole
source of support that modernity has not taught her 'to think and feel'
about the unity of her life, she might well reply that life itself has
compelled her to learn how to manage its complexity.
I will come back to the issue of immoral demands that roles
sometimes make of role-bearers when focusing, below, on the pressures
that some extreme emergencies may exert on the unified, nonjurisdictional view of morality that I just asserted. For the moment,
however, I want to underscore the fact that, as agents, governments and

24

Alasdair Macintyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral The01y 3rd edn London, Duckworth
2007, p 204.
25
Macintyre (2007, p 204-205).
26
For a specific defence of this claim elaborated in relation to roles: A.I. Applbaum
Ethics.for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life Princeton,
Princeton University Press 1999.
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their representatives are also in the position of having to deal appropriately
with the many additional demands of their roles.
A liberal ethic ofgovernance
If we conceive of the relationship of state governance as imposing a
general ethic of action on governments in their dealings with the governed,
it makes sense to inquire into the compass of the legitimate 'role of
government.' The main problem with following this path of inquiry like
this one is that the compass of the said role is one of the most controversial
issues of contemporary political philosophy. To the extent that they
recognise the legitimacy of at least some forms of government, political
traditions disagree vigorously about what the role ideally entails. At one
end of the spectrum, some argue that governments should be no more than
'night-watchmen', whose role is limited to the protection of the governed
against force and fraud. At the other end, some stand for far-reaching
governmental duties to meet the overall needs of the governed and shape,
even improve, society and its members through (often quite invasive and
micromanaged) intervention. I do not intend to resolve this deep-seated
and multifaceted controversy here.

Instead, I propose to build on the work of theorists whose middleground position reflects the aspiration of many contemporary
governments. I am referring to the liberal idea put forward by John Rawls
and recently reinterpreted by Arthur Ripstein, according to which there
ought to be a significant division of responsibility between governed and
government. According to Ripstein's very general articulation of the
claim, it is a government's 'responsibility to protect important liberties and
opportunities, and also to set up and enforce important schemes of social
cooperation that are prerequisite to an acceptable life for all. m The idea,
grounded in an ideal conception of justice, is that certain types of
individual misfortunes, obstacles, and needs should be held in common
through the intercession of governments, and be treated as everyone's
problem. However, once appropriate governmental institutions are in
place, the governed are expected to take special responsibility for their
own lives. Note here that, despite my personal sympathies for this kind of
27

Arthur Ripstein 'Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal' Law and
Philosophy 19 (2000) pp 751-779 at pp 756-758.
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approach, I am appealing to it primarily because of its remarkable ability
to expose impo1iant facets of the relationship between governments-aswe-know-them and emergencies. To the extent that the reader reasonably
believes that the legitimate role of government is somewhat wider or
narrower, he or she should feel free to recast the insights presented here in
terms of how he or she conceives the parameters of the role, mutatis
mutandis.
Inherently public emergencies

The overarching point I want to make in the rest of this section and the
ones that follow is that some emergencies may compel governments to
play their role-or, perhaps more accurately, to discharge the social
functions grounding their role-differently than usual. 28 Referring to
Rawls and Ripstein's idea of a significant division of responsibility
between ordinary individuals and government, I identified the general
parameters of the role of government as the protection of important
liberties and opportunities, as well as the creation and enforcement of
imp01iant schemes of social cooperation. One of the ways in which
liberals tend to flesh out this position is by advocating a prominent role for
governments in the provision of (economic) 'public goods.' Markets break
down with respect to the provision of certain important goods (because of
their 'indivisibility' 29). All liberals accept that it is part of a government's
general role to exercise its powers of regulation and taxation to provide
these goods (or at least to ensure their provision through private means). 30
28

Depending on the level of generality at which the parameters of the role are defined, it
might sometimes be even more accurate to say that a government has a different role to
play in the face of an emergency. The argument in this section should be read with this
slight caveat in mind.
29
More precisely, a 'public good' is, on the economists' definition, a good that is both
non-exclusionary (meaning that if the good is provided to anyone, no member of society
can be excluded from benefiting from it) and non-rival in consumption (meaning that
more than one individual can simultaneously benefit from the good without preventing
others from also consuming the good). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz Economics 2nct
edn New York, Norton 1997, p 157; John Rawls A TheOJJ' of Justice Revised edn Oxford,
Oxford University Press 1999, s 42.
30
See generally Samuel Freeman 'Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libe1iarianism is not a
Liberal View' Phil and Public Affairs 30 (2002), pp 105-151 at pp 119-120; Limn
Murphy and Thomas Nagel The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice Oxford, Oxford
University Press 2002, pp 45-46.
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Commonly mentioned public goods are national defence, police and fire
protection, social order, public health and sanitation, highways, street
lighting, ports and canals, water and sewer works, and education. 31
This idea provides a highly plausible explanation for why so many
people felt that it was part of the government's role to ensure the proper
maintenance of the levee system in New Orleans. Not only had the
government openly undertaken to maintain the levees, thus creating
expectations that it would do so properly, but the levee system was a
public good. Of course, I do not wish to deny that governments qua agents
may sometimes undertake to provide other kinds of services, and do so
legitimately. I am saying, however, that an emergency that endangers the
provision of goods that governments have a duty to ensure may intelligibly
be labelled 'public. ' 32 As I suggested earlier, if we feel that governments
have duties that exceed the mere demands of human solidarity in such
emergencies, it is because some such duties are already inherent in the role
31

Of course, the concept of public good is also invoked by other traditions of political
thought. To the extent that these traditions understand the concept differently, the list of
goods that governments must provide in order to fulfil their role may vary accordingly.
32
Some may wonder why Sorell (2002, p 22) insists that public emergencies are 'usually
the responsibility of public agencies and their officials'. One reason might be that, like
me, Sorell considers that governments have a basic moral duty to provide at least some
emergency assistance that does not flow from their governmental role, but from their
unadorned status as moral agents. However, if this interpretation is accurate, I am not
convinced that emergencies that fall outside the ambit of the role of government, and in
relation to which governments have no duty to intervene qua governments, may
intelligibly be understood as inherently public. Indeed, duties to provide emergency
assistance in such cases may be shared by governments as well as a plethora of other
moral agents. One possible explanation for Sorell's terminological choice is that
governments are sometimes the only agents in a position to provide the needed assistance
without making unacceptable sacrifices. When this is the case, governments may well be
the only agents with a duty, or at least an undefeated duty, to act. Yet, pace Sorell, such
emergencies may not be so much public emergencies as emergencies tout court. Another
possibility is that Sorell considers that inherently public functions that governments
delegate to private actors are, in a way, no more their own, yet, in another sense, they
remain part of the compass of the general role of government. If this is what he means,
his choice of terminology is rather imprecise. Finally, Sorell may be refen-ing to
situations in which an emergency threatens a public good, but where there is no
government in place to address it-consider the case of widespread violence in a failed
state like Somalia. Although this interpretation is plausible and worth mentioning, I doubt
that it is what Sorell had in mind, given his sustained emphasis on 'the state' elsewhere in
his article.
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governments should play. An emergency may require a government to go
to greater lengths than usual and take extraordinary avenues to fulfill its
role. Since emergencies often introduce forceful and conflicting reasons
for action and may alter the moral landscape of a situation, a government
may be under a duty to resort to different, sometimes much more radical
or extraordinarily preventive, means to respond.
Of course, a government that was failing to fulfill its role
appropriately prior to a public emergency may attempt to invoke the
emergency as an excuse for not discharging it or for resorting to
unjustifiable, perhaps shockingly radical, means of discharging it. 33 At this
point, however, I am setting aside governments that seek to evade their
role, but on the implications of emergencies for those that strive to play
their role legitimately. My point is that legitimate ethics of state
governance pre-exist emergencies and determine their publicness. They
determine which emergencies fall within the sphere of a government's
responsibilities, and they give shape to its duties in relation to such
emergencies. Although often neglected, this idea is not new. For example,
it is partly on the basis of a similar insight that Michael Walzer frames his
notorious 'supreme emergency' argument. He writes that:
no government can put the life of the community itself and of all
its members at risk, so long as there are actions available to it, even
immoral actions, that would avoid or reduce the risk. It is for the
sake of risk avoidance or risk reduction that governments are
chosen. That is what political leaders are for; that is their first
task. 34
Walzer's premises are contentious. Moreover, his general understanding
of roles differs in important respects from the one I have defended above. I
challenge Walzer on these issues below, but it is interesting to note here,
in passing, the role-based structure of his approach.

33

This kind of governmental behaviour and some typical fmms of abuse associated with
it constitute one of Naomi Klein's main loci of criticism in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise
ofDisaster Capitalism London, Allen Lane 2007.
34
Michael Walzer 'Emergency Ethics' in Arguing about War New Haven, Yale
University Press 2004, pp 33-50 at p 42.
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At last, we have what I think is a suitably articulated notion of
'public emergency.' Of course, more needs to be said about such
emergencies. Like all emergencies, public emergencies may vary in term
of the nature, degree and extent of the harm they threaten, the risk of their
occurrence, and their immediacy. Thus, questions about what
governmental responses are justifiable necessarily extend beyond
discussions of publicness. It is only when we take such distinctions of
degree seriously that the full complexity of public emergencies comes to
light.

C. T AXONOMISING PUBLIC EMERGENCIES
H.P. Lee begins his seminal study of emergency powers in Australia by
remarking that, during the life of every state, there will arise occasions
when peace and tranquility-which he assumes to constitute the normal
state of affairs-may be disrupted by natural, economic, or violent
emergencies. He adds that: 'Unless effectively contained such aberrant
conditions will reach such a critical stage that a nation's constitutional and
legal framework will be shattered. ' 35 By envisioning the kind of
emergencies that cause political and legal institutions to be shaken to their
core, Lee is guilty of a sin similar to Tom Sorell's: the sin of focusing on
worst-case scenarios and neglecting important distinctions of degree. Lee
goes even further down this path by explicitly assuming that there is an
unavoidable slippery slope and that all public emergencies may lead to
generalised disarray. Although such slides into social and institutional
chaos are possible, I believe that we should resist the assumption that all
public emergencies are of this sort.
Some emergencies seriously endanger the well-being of the
governed in ways that may affect the governmental provision of legitimate
goods and services, but do not come even close to threatening to cause the
collapse of the legal system or of entire governmental apparatuses. For
example, isolated assaults or rape attempts often constitute emergencies
that interfere with governmental efforts to protect the governed against
crimes. Assuming that it is part of a government's legitimate role to
provide such protection, I see no reason why these discrete individual
35

H.P. Lee Emergency Powers Sydney, The Law Book Company Limited 1984, p 1.
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emergencies may not also, pace Sorell and others, bear the label 'public. ' 36
Typically, such isolated public emergencies do not pose any significant
threat to governmental apparatuses. Moreover, they are unlikely to require
governments to resort to any special means beyond ordinarily legitimate
criminal law, criminal process, and law-enforcement mechanisms. 37
Consider also the case of more wide-scale emergencies, such as sudden
floods, that constitute urgent threats to specific public goods such as
public health and sanitation, transportation systems, and certain aspects of
social order, e.g. associated waves oflooting. Experience shows that many
such wide-scale emergencies pose no real threat of general governmental
collapse.
A possible difference is that, in the latter kind of situations,
governments may be compelled to respond in unusual ways in order to
fulfill their role. A government may need to involve particularly equipped
and more efficient agencies such as the military and free up substantial
funds. It may need to seize control of essential services that it normally
relies on individuals or private corporations to provide. Otherwise
effective schemes of social cooperation may need to be modifiedconsider, at a general level, the possible need to bypass constitutionallyentrenched federalism limits where they exist. Sometimes, a government
may even need to limit the constitutionally-entrenched rights of
individuals and groups. In such situations, the issue of moral justification
ought to be at the forefront of a government's consideration when it
designs its responses. Of course, it is also conceivable that special
governmental responses may be needed to respond to isolated public
emergencies, perhaps especially if the failure of ordinaiy means would
lead to unconscionably widespread harm. Consider the possibility of grave
acts of public sabotage that jeopardise essential government services, and
thus indirectly threaten the population that relies on them. Here, as always,
justifiability ought to guide a government's response. For example, it
ought to keep in mind that the threshold for a justified (ordinary) criminal
36

In fact, philosophers from a wide an-ay of political traditions conceive of crimes as
'public wrongs.' E.g. R Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford, Blackwell Publishing
1974, p 67; R.A. Duff and Sandra Marshall 'Sharing Wrongs' Canadian Joumal of Laiv
and Jurisprudence 11 (1998) pp 7-22.
37
Compare: Oren Gross 'Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constihltional?' Yale Law Journal 112 (2003) pp 1011-1130 at p 1087, who assumes
that, by definition, public ' [e]mergencies call for extraordina1y governmental responses.'
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law response is likely to be lower than for a justified resort to emergency
powers that lack the same procedural and substantive safeguards. To
paraphrase Sorell, what is in the balance clearly matters, at least up to a
certain point. I add this last qualification to underline that the counteremergency means to which governments might resort may also be subject
to moral limits that have very little, if anything, to do with what hangs in
the balance. Some theorists speak, inter alia, of the prohibition against
torture or against intentionally and deliberately killing the innocent in such
terms. Others, like Bernard Williams, speak in more general terms of a
'Basic Legitimation Demand' that governments not become 'part of the
problem' by resorting to terror in their efforts to protect the governed from
harm. 38
The temptation to overlook the issue of justification is especially
strong in relation to emergencies that not only endanger the provision of
specific public goods, but also the general provision of government (and,
thus, of all services that governments may legitimately provide). Here
again, there may be variations in terms of the degree and extent of harm
threatened, the risk of its occurrence, its immediacy, and so forth. For
example, a grave, though isolated, act of treason against a government
may not present the same risks as a full-blown civil war. In other cases,
the threat to governance may be confined to specific portions of a statethink of active combat zones in a country like Sri Lanka. It may also affect
the state in its entirety, or be international in scope. Nonetheless, general
emergencies for political and legal institutions are those that tend to
prompt theorists to start speaking of 'moral black holes' and governmental
officials to start thinking about pressing the panic button. 39 I am one of

38

Bernard Williams In the Beginning Was the DeedPrinceton, Princeton University Press
2005, p 4. For a discussion of other important moral dimensions that straightforward
balancing metaphors about security tend to obscure or disregard, see Jeremy Waldron
'Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance' Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003)
pp 191-210.
39
On the basis of a careful historical survey, G.L. Negretto and J.A. Aguilar Rivera argue
that:
[T]he afte1math of independence in Latin America led to a protracted process of
factional struggle, in which the legitimacy of newly established regimes was
constantly challenged by warring elite. In this context, the use of exceptional
measures was a permanent necessity. However, in the absence of adequate
mechanisms, governments were usually forced to act beyond or against the
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those who believe that there are no such things as moral black holes and
that morality applies to moral agents at all times and places (perhaps
making some allowance for genuine doomsday scenarios). Yet as I have
argued, this does not mean that the demands of morality are inflexible. In
fact, they may very depending on the situation. One implication is that we
should not dismiss without scrutiny claims that, with respect to
emergencies threatening the 'the life of the nation, ' 40 'the framework of
rights itself,' 41 or 'the organised life of the community of which the state is
composed, ' 42 morality permits, or even requires, governmental behaviour
that would otherwise be unacceptable.
Unfortunately, given the already significant breadth of this article,
I cam10t afford to say much more about the justifiability of given
governmental responses to given public emergencies. Instead, I want to
focus on a commonly-encountered line of argument that permeates much
of today's popular and theoretical discourse about the justifiability of
governmental behaviour in times of severe public emergencies. I am
referring to Michael Walzer's paradoxical contention that governments are
sometimes permitted to sidestep absolute moral limits when confronted
with 'supreme emergencies.' Much, I think, can be learned by scrutinising
and questioning the premises of Walzer's in extremis reasoning. In
particular, such scrutiny may rectify some familiar misconceptions about
the moral position of governments in relation to public emergencies writ
large, as well as about morality in general.

constitution, hoping that they could later justify these measures, given the
constraints of the situation. This was a dangerous expedient.
G.L. Negretto and J.A. Aguilar Rivera 'Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin
America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship'
Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000) pp 1797-1823 at 1804.
40
E.g. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (South Africa) s
37(2).
41
Alan Brudner 'Guilt Under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentaiy Supremacy'
Criminal Law Quarterly 40 (1998) pp 287-325 at p 292.
42
Lawless v Ireland (No 3) [ 1961] 1 EHRR 15 at p 31 (para 28) (European Court of
Human Rights).
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D. MORAL ABSOLUTES, ROLES, AND SUPREME (PUBLIC?)
EMERGENCIES

1. MORAL ABSOLUTES AND MICHAEL W ALZER'S SUPREME EMERGENCIES

A very wide array of theorists believe that there are moral absolutes. By
absolutes, I mean norms that are always valid and never overridable,
justifiably infringed, or otherwise subject to exception. At a high level of
generality, most familiar moral theories accept the existence of such
absolutes. For example, deontologists tend to ground their theories in
broad, universally-applicable absolutes such as the Golden Rule, the law
of love, or 'categorical imperatives.' They also often expound entire
systems of subordinate, more specific, absolute principles. Utilitarians,
who are known for their pervasively contingent moral stances, also treat
their basic injunction to act so as to produce the greatest good for the
greatest number as absolute. Much the same is true of other f01ms of
consequentialism. Even so-called moral particularists tend to acknowledge
that there may be some moral absolutes, although at less abstract levels of
thinking-i.e. absolutes on which morality and moral thought do not
depend. 43 Of course, debate about moral absolutes continues. However,
the debate does not appear to focus so much on the possibility of moral
absolutes, as on how many there are, and at what level of thinking, or
specificity, they may exist.
To the extent that one's stance on moral absolutes may affect one's
stance on the flexibility of morality, it is also likely to affect one's stance
on what may justifiably be done in the face of an emergency. Michael
Walzer thinks that there are moral absolutes, and not only at the highest
levels of generality. According to him, ordinary individuals must not
intentionally kill the innocent, even in extreme situations. His stance is
absolutist: 'A moral person will accept risk, will even accept death, rather
than kill the innocent. ' 44 Yet there is a twist. Walzer believes that
governments and their officials are in a different moral position insofar as
they may be confronted with another possibly conflicting absolute. As I
43

E.g. Jonathan Dancy 'Moral Particularism' in: E.N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford
Encyclopedia
of
Philosophy
(Summer
2005
Edition),
online:
<http ://p Jato .stanford. edu/archi ves/sum2005/entries/moral-particularism/>.
44
Walzer (2004, p 41).
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noted earlier, he thinks that 'no government can put the life of the
community itself and of all its members at risk, so long as there are actions
available to it, even immoral actions, that would avoid or reduce the
risk. ' 45 When governments cannot live up to this additional absolute
without urgently violating the first-i.e. when there are no alternatives
available and the two absolutes genuinely conflict-then, Walzer tells us,
there is a 'supreme emergency.'
Instead of speaking of 'supreme emergencies,' many theorists
invoke the category of 'moral dilemma'-often qualified as 'tragic'-to
characterise situations in which moral absolutes conflict irreconcilably.
The dilemma is tragic, they say, when the conflicting absolutes are
incommensurable, so that no matter how morally sensitive agents in the
predicament may be, they are doomed to act immorally. 46 The supremeemergency argument is of a different kind. Walzer does not claim that the
two absolutes he defends are incommensurable. On the contrary, he claims
that in a genuine supreme emergency, the prohibition on killing the
innocent is 'devalued' 47 in relation to the possibility of 'a far greater
immorality. ' 48 The prohibition may be 'overridden, ' 49 in what would
amount to a 'justified' 50 response. Thus, whereas in the moral dilemma
category there is no right answer to the problem, in supreme emergency
scenarios, it is assumed that a government should choose the 'necessary'
course of action over the rights of the innocent.
Note that the nature of the 'should' m the last sentence is
ambiguous. Is it moral? On the one hand, Walzer writes that, in a supreme
emergency, 'the disaster that looms before us devalues morality itself and
leaves us free to do whatever is military necessary to avoid the disaster, so
45

Walzer (2004, p 42).
E.g. John Gardner and Timothy Macklem 'Reasons' in: Jules Coleman and Scott
Shapiro (eds) The Oxford Handbook ofJurisprudence and Philosophy ofLaw pp 441-475
Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002 at p 473; Bernard Williams 'Conflicts of Values'
in: Moral Luck pp 71-82 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1981 at p 74; Thomas
Nagel 'War and Massacre' in: Mortal Questions pp 53-74 Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 1979.
47
Walzer (2004, p 40).
48
Walzer (2004, p 50).
49
Walzer (2004, p 34). See also Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral
Argument with Historical Illustrations New York, Basic Books 1977, p 259.
50
Walzer (2004, p 54).
46
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long as we don't produce an even worse disaster. ' 51 On the other hand, he
claims that the doctrine of 'supreme emergency is a way of manoeuvring
between two different and characteristically opposed understandings of
morality.' 52 The first, he takes to reflect the 'absolutism of rights,' which
fixes 'the everyday constraints on war-making (and on all adversarial
engagements).' 53 The other is utilitarianism, according to which
'innocence is only one value that must be weighed against others in the
pursuit of the greatest good of the greatest number. ' 54 Although normally
limited by absolute rights, utilitarianism 'reimposes itself' in extremis for
governmental agents. 55 Thus, Walzer does not think that there are moral
black holes or that one may ever disregard morality as a whole. 56 It seems
best to understand him as speaking of two sets of moral considerations that
are, if not completely incommensurable, in extreme tension with each
other in times of supreme emergency.

2. CHALLENGING W ALZER'S ACCOUNT
Disputing the centrality ofgovernments
One may challenge Walzer's moral calculus from a variety of angles, two
of which I want to discuss. My first point is structural. What, if anything,
makes governments justified in infringing considerations that are
unqualifiedly absolute for other agents? What makes them so special? At
various points in his work, Walzer flirts with the idea of representation.
Recall, for example, the passage reproduced earlier, in which he argues
that governments may be justified in protecting the life of the community
through immoral actions at least partly because they 'are chosen.' This
strand of argument in Walzer's work is far from seamless. If
representation is such a decisive factor, one may ask, why are
revolutionary or dissenting groups with plausible claims to represent their
51

Walzer (2004, p 40) [Emphasis added].
Walzer (2004, p 35).
53
Walzer (2004, p 35, 39).
54
Walzer (2004, p 35).
55
Walzer (2004, p 40, 50).
56
Note further that Walzer thinks that a justifiable governmental response to a supreme
emergency must be proportionate in addition to being necessary. The threat must also be
imminent. See Walzer (1977, p 231).
52
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political community in the same moral position? Walzer seems to concede
the point, at least partially, when he recognises that non-state terrorist
groups responding to threats genocidal in character may be able to invoke
a supreme emergency to justify extreme measures. 57
One may press the point even further and ask why representation
should be a decisive factor at all. Walzer speaks of a governmental
contract through which the governed cede some of their rights and powers
to their (representative) government. Yet he concurrently concedes that
'individuals have no right to save themselves by killing the innocent' that
they could transfer to governments in anticipation of supreme
emergencies. 58 Thus it is unclear what role he understands representation
to play in his argument for dissociating governments from some of the
most important demands of ordinary morality. To be sure, Walzer argues
that the role of representation has to be understood in tandem with a claim
about the value of community. Governmental representation, he claims, is
not merely representation of individuals. It is representation of individuals
and of the political community. Walzer argues that the value of the
political community is not reducible to the sum of its parts, and thus that
it adds something to the representation equation (and to the prerogatives of
the representative government). Notice, however, that by making this
move, Walzer shifts the emphasis of his argument away from
representation towards an appreciation of the value of what is represented.
Given the case that he is attempting to build, this move is perhaps
unavoidable. As C.A.J. Coady remarks, 'representation, by itself, does not
do much to alter one's moral status: it extends one's powers and
capacities, though it also restricts them in various ways, but the question
of moral limits and freedoms will be largely a matter for ordinary moral
assessment of the institutional purposes for which these powers have been
created. 59 In other words, it is the purpose and value of governmental
action, more than any independent fact about representation, that is the
linchpin of Walzer' s argument.
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In a way, then, we are back to the question of the moral position of
governments in relation to their role in society, asking what they may
justifiably do to secure public goods. To fully grasp the ramifications of
Walzer's argument in this regard, it is crucial to appreciate the following
point. Even if one accepts, as I did earlier, that something like 'national
defence' is a public good that governments ought to provide, it does not
necessarily follow that governments may ever justifiably commit
immoralities in the process. In the context of his discussion of supreme
emergencies, Walzer seeks to bridge this gap by assigning an overriding
moral importance to 'the life of the community.' I shall discuss this
argument at greater length in the next section. For now, notice only that if
the life of the community really has the supreme moral importance that
Walzer ascribes to it-not only for governments who represent it, but for
all of us who are part of it-then it is puzzling why he does not recognise
that, in extremis, any agent who is in a position to defend it effectively
may be justified in doing so. In fact, his method of constructing
asymmetry in this regard seems slightly disingenuous. Individuals, he
says, must uphold the rights of innocents even in life-threatening situations
of self-defence. 60 Governments must also uphold these rights, but may be
justified in overriding them when necessary to defend the life of the
community. Is it really so inconceivable that ordinary individuals could
ever be in a position to safeguard the life of the community by having to
kill innocents? I will spare the reader the many colourful scenarios that
could apply. To be fair, Walzer sometimes claims that the types of
dilemmas exemplified by supreme emergencies-which he generically
terms 'dirty hands' dilemmas 61 -do not only confront governments and
their officials. 'No doubt,' he writes, 'we can get our hands dirty in private
life also, and sometimes, no doubt, we should. ' 62 That is to say, we all may
sometimes, and even sometimes should, do 'the right thing [... ] in
utilitarian terms' even if acting in this way would leave us 'guilty of a
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moral wrong' in absolutist terms. 63 Yet Walzer argues that governments
are significantly more likely to face 'dirty hands' scenarios. He also seems
to think that only governments-qua institutional role-bound 'structures
for organising collective action'-may appropriately dirty their hands
when the situation is one of 'supreme emergency.'
In light of my earlier discussion of the place of roles in moral
thinking, this last claim is puzzling. If Walzer really thinks that it is always
morally wrong to violate the right of innocents not to be killed
intentionally, and if a given ethic of governance sometimes requires such
action, then it is a bad ethic, at least to the extent of the required
immorality. When using the terminology of justification or permission,
which merely implies the perpetration of a prima facie moral wrong or of
no wrong at all, Walzer avoids this criticism. However, he also regularly
departs from this language in favour of a more uncompromising approach.
For example, he speaks of violations of the (absolute) rights of the
i1mocent in supreme emergencies as 'great immoralities.' 64 He even seems
to acknowledge the instability of his conception of the role of government
when he writes that we, as moral agents, may 'have a right to avoid, if we
possibly can, those [governmental and other] positions in which we might
be forced to do terrible things. ' 65 When one appreciates that whatever a
government does is done by individuals acting on its behalf, and that these
individuals may well be not absolved of individual responsibility simply
because they act on behalf of the government, the discomfort underlying
this concession becomes unambiguous. Notice, however, that this specific
tension dissolves if we posit that, given the importance of political
communities, it is not only governments but all of us who are absolutely
prohibited from putting the life of the community and those of its
members at risk so long as there are actions available to us that would
avoid or reduce the risk. Then, alleged paths of escape from absolutes into
role-based hiding places fade away, and the tragic sense of the dilemma
takes its starkest form. 66 Of course, one may argue that Walzer supposes
63
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that ought implies can and that only governmental agencies and their
representatives are in a position to defend the community in situations of
supreme emergency. However, even if this observation were to hold true
most of the time, it would remain a contingent truth. The deeper question
is whether an agent-individual or governmental-whose intervention
would be effective and necessary to defend the life of the community may,
or even must, intervene, despite having to violate the rights of the innocent
in the process. Here, either Walzer is a 'rights absolutist' or he is not.
Those who think that he is (or should be) tend not to speak of supreme
emergencies as providing all-things-considered justifications. Instead, they
invoke the language of excuses, which does not deny wrongdoing in any
way.
This last, often implicit, asse1iion does not end the debate. Indeed,
isn't morality more lenient at the level of excuses towards governments
facing supreme emergencies? Some argue that it is, emphasising that the
power of judging and acting in such situations, like in so many other
significant public emergencies, is a 'hot potato' that people are often more
than happy to surrender to governments. Thus, the argument goes, if
governments 'do their best to cope in a situation that probably no one else
would handle better,' shouldn't that be good enough? Should we not
expect morality to be more charitable towards them in such
circumstances? 67 Of course, the fact that an agent is dealing with an
emergency, perhaps especially an unforeseeable one, that requires quick
unplanned action may affect the standard of behaviour to which this agent
should be held. However, the validity of this point extends to all agents,
not only governments. The argument that governments would probably do
a better job of responding to some emergencies obviously makes the
matter more specific, but is it really a sufficient reason for being more
lenient towards them? Consider the following example. Police officers are
often in a better position than us to deal with various types of violent
emergencies, and are often more likely to be successful in addressing
them. They are trained for such situations, they are better equipped, they
tend to be more readily obeyed, and so forth. Arguably, however, even
when acting under emergency-related pressures, police officers should be
Lee (eds) Ethics and Weapons of lvlass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives
pp 139-162 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004 at pp 146, 154.
67
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held to higher standards of reasonableness-of composure, care,
accuracy-than the rest of us. They should certainly not be held to lower
standards. We expect them to be at least equally, if not more, level-headed
than other individuals, and we conceive of any higher demands placed on
them as functions of the role they assume. I believe that the same is true of
governments in general with respect to an even wider array of
emergencies, including the supreme. With greater resources, information,
authority, as well as opportunities for contingency planning and training
come greater responsibilities and greater expectations of virtue and
reasonableness. 68 Throughout history, many governments have clearly
failed to live up to such expectations in times of emergency and, as a
result, may not deserve of our charity or leniency. On the contrary, many
of them may warrant outright moral censure.

Human communities and the moral world
In more ways than one, the confinement of the logic of supreme
emergencies to governments is unstable. Yet, even if we deny that it
should be so confined, supreme emergencies may still be conceivable. The
more common challenge to Walzer's calculus questions its very premises.
As one author has recently observed, 'the prohibition on intentionally
killing innocent people functions in our moral thinking as a sort of
touchstone of moral and intellectual health. ' 69 It is not the aspect of
Walzer's thinking that I wish to question here. Instead, I want to focus on
the other side of the dilemma: the allegedly supreme, overriding
imp01iance that Walzer attaches to 'the life of the community.' Much has
already been written on this point, so I shall focus on aspects relevant to
my wider argument.
Emphasising the importance of 'the political community,' Walzer
writes that:
Some theorists even take the further step---perhaps one too many~of claiming that
excuses are simply not available to governments, owing to the nature of their agency and
the nature of their role. See e.g. Andrew P. Simester 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of
Law' in: Victor V. Ramraj (ed) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality pp 289-313
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008 at pp. 300-302.
69
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When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial
extension or governmental structure or prestige or honor, but in
what we might think of as its ongoingness, then we face a loss that
is greater than we can imagine, except for the destruction of
humanity itself. We face moral as well as physical extinction, the
end of a way of life as well as of a set of particular lives, the
disappearance of people like us. 70
Of course, the bare mention of 'our community' is too thin. The
disintegration of a political community living according to fascist ideals
would be no great loss. However, assuming an acceptably thicker account,
the importance of communal ties is apparent. Communities tend to be
valuable as shared repositories of language, values, and practices that
enable and inform many of the substantive goods that compose our lives
as individual human beings. They also provide ongoing historical
narratives within which we are able to locate our lives and give them
meaning. However, it is not sufficient to point to the undoubted value of
'the political community.' In a day and age in which our political
affiliations are increasingly plural and multi-layered as a result of mass
migration, globalisation, and communications, one may wonder to which
political communities Walzer is referring. Interestingly, he avoids
focusing explicitly on the emblematic political community that is 'the
nation.' One reason for this evasion may be that, historically speaking,
'most nations have always been culturally diverse, problematic, protean
and artificial constructs that take shape very quickly and come apart just as
fast. ' 71 Instead, Walzer seems to privilege state communities-but does
not defend his choice. At one point, he even acknowledges that 'the state
is nothing more than [... ] a particular structure for organizing collective
action that can always be replaced by some other structure.' 72 Perhaps
even more noteworthy, Walzer seems to discount the possibility that, in
some societies and for some people, forms of communal ties that are not
usually conceived as political are as, if not more, important-e.g. family
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relationships, friendships, religious and professional affiliations. Thus, the
elevation of 'the political community' to a supreme status is problematic.
Many of the deep tensions permeating Walzer' s argument seem to
come from this misplaced emphasis. Communities do play a fundamental
role in our lives. We are social animals, and we would not be who we are
without our communities. However, individual human beings are, and
ought to be considered, the supreme loci of value, or as some might say,
the ultimate moral units. Walzer's talk of communities as having some
sort of 'transcendence' and 'different and larger prerogatives' sits
awkwardly with this proposition. 73 In consistence with the humanistic
principle that I endorsed earlier, communities matter not in themselves but
to their individual members, whose shared way of life they embody and
inform. Their value does not transcend the value of human life. Thus, an
emergency that endangers a political community's institutions and its way
of life, but does not threaten innocent human lives-e.g. a war waged in
accordance with the jus in hello-could hardly be said to threaten what is
of supreme moral importance. Admittedly, there may be more intricate
situations in which there is a threat of both moral and physical extinction,
endangering 'the end of a way of life as well as of a set of particular lives.'
Some commentators claim that in such a situation, we need to decide
between two versions of the humanistic premise: '(1) treat every person as
having ultimate moral value and (2) never treat any person only as a
means.' 74 They add that, in some interpretations, an emergency response
that takes the life of some innocents to save a much larger number from,
say, genocide might satisfy (1) while violating (2). Yet, they also often
remark, correctly in my view, that this kind of distinction is 'disturbingly
difficult to see' and that such situations are extremely rare, if not 'factually
implausible.' Others take a firmer stance and resist drawing any
correlation between the category of supreme emergency and a notion as
fluid as political community. Instead, they tend to reject Walzer's category
entirely. 75
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Should we dispense with the category altogether? If we shift the
emphasis away from threats to communities to threats to the sheer
possibility of human life, some scenarios that are harder to discount
emerge. Consider emergencies that threaten the very possibility ofhumanlife-as-we-know-it. Think, for example, of a global nuclear war, which
might yield a world in which the survivors lapse into a bestial condition in
order to survive in an environment in which nothing usually deemed
necessary for human flourishing remains. This type of emergency, I take
it, is what Henry Shue calls 'supreme moral emergency' or what David
Wiggins calls a 'dire emergency.' In Shue's words, the category
encompasses emergencies that endanger 'the moral fabric of the life of at
least a large portion of humanity.' They are emergencies that represent a
'threat to principled social life in general' characterised by 'the
unprincipled exertion of sheer force.' 76 In Wiggins's words, they are
emergencies which, under a stem enough interpretation, jeopardise the
survival of 'human civilization' or 'the very conditions under which
ethical choice itself is possible. ' 77 They are emergencies that even
deontological theorists who ground their rigidly absolutist positions in
non-consequentialist, highly-general foundational principles, would need
to acknowledge as undermining of absolutism. 78 These are the
emergencies that may render intelligible Walzer's paradoxical idea that
some emergencies can make 'great immoralities morally possible.' 79
Indeed these are emergencies that are, as it were, ultimate. In a passage
antecedent to any arguments about communities, Walzer himself seems to
recognise the unique, even foundational, nature of such hypothetical
moments: 'How can we, with our principles and prohibitions, stand by and
watch the destruction of the moral world in which those principles and
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prohibitions have their hold?' 80 One can ve1y well make sense of this
contention without invoking political communities in any way.
Note that, by threatening to undermine the efficacy and
justifiability of norms in such a radical way, supreme moral emergencies
also unavoidably imperil the possibility of the ideal of the rule of lawand even of law tout court-to the point that it may not be very relevant to
speak of the possibility of a legal response. In fact, it seems to me that the
dangers of abuse and mistake associated with a category as earthshattering as 'supreme moral emergency' would be so great that
governments should not even attempt to account for it pre-emptively. Of
course, such emergencies are conceivable. The point is that they are the
rarest of the rare, the unlikely exception to the exception, and that it is
clearly inadvisable to take them as paradigms for the study and
systematisation of the relationship between emergencies, morality, and
appropriate governmental responses. 81 In all other cases, governments
should strive to respond to emergencies in fully justified ways and, to the
extent that there are any moral absolutes, respect them while so doing.

E. ONE LAST PROVOCATION: PUBLICLY DECLARED
EMERGENCIES

By way of conclusion to this aiiicle, I deem it important to say a few
things about one last and disturbingly widespread way of thinking about
public emergencies. Although the leap back to more conceptual
considerations might seem abrupt to the reader, a discussion of public
emergencies would not be complete without noting the existence of this
different conception and exposing it.
Emergencies, some believe, are 'public' when they are declared or
proclaimed to be so by governments. This view takes various shapes. At
one extreme, some argue that public emergencies are inevitably
constituted, or created, by governmental declarations since, in the words of
80
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Giorgio Agamben, 'the only circumstances that are necessary and
objective are those that are declared to be so. ' 82 Although it is undeniable
that governments may at times generate some worrisome emergencies by
acting abusively and creating unjustified threats of harm, it is simply
wrong (and an open-door to abuse) to think that the existence of a public
emergency ultimately comes down to a governmental declaration of any
sort. Emergencies are situations in which there is a risk of serious harm
and an urgent response is needed to avert or minimise that harm. As such,
they often exist (or not) independently of anything that governments say
and do about them.
That being said, it is also a mistake to think that a governmental
declaration of emergency is 'just that, a claim, inserted into the regular
operation of political life. ' 83 The truth, I think, lies somewhere in the
middle. Whereas a governmental declaration of emergency is not
constitutive of a public emergency, it is neither just another governmental
claim. Typically, a governmental declaration of emergency is meant to be
performative. It is a distinct speech-act by which a government brings into
existence a different normative order, often known as a 'state of
emergency.' 84 The alleged substantive basis for declaring such a state of
emergency is usually that the legal order in which the government
normally operates does not allow it to address one or more public
emergencies as necessary. However, there is an important distinction
between the substantive basis of the declaration and the formal act of its
utterance. On the one hand, a government's decision to declare and
implement a state of emergency may be criticised in substantive terms. For
example, given the nature of the emergency, the government may already
be in a position to address it appropriately within the parameters of the
existing legal order. Likewise, when extraordinary measures are necessary,
the ones introduced may be too far-reaching. Criticisms of this type are
substantive or content-dependent; they involve an assessment that is
82
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dependent on the actual characteristics of the related emergencies. On the
other hand, governments' responses to public emergencies may also, on
occasion, be criticised for content-independent reasons, such as a failure to
declare, or declare properly, the establishment of a state of emergency. In
order to make sense of any governmental emergency response and assess
its justifiability, one first needs to know whether there is a genuine
emergency, and know something about its characteristics. One may then
ask whether the response is reasonably tailored to the emergency. To what
extent is the response necessary? Is it proportionate? However, when the
emergency response specifically involves a significant departure from an
existing legal order, many theorists and lawmakers think that it must also
be formally declared.
Legal instruments that explicitly recognise the possibility of states
of emergency almost always require that they be formally and publicly
declared (in addition to requiring that they meet various substantive
conditions). This generalisation applies as much to state constitutions and
legislation as to international treaties. 85 There are often variations in terms
of who may make the declaration, how, with whose approval, for how
long, and to which effect, but the basic requirement is almost omnipresent.
Interestingly, in the case of legal instruments that explicitly recognise the
possibility of states of emergency but do not require a formal declaration,
judicial bodies have sometimes been known to read in the requirement.
For example in the case of Cyprus v Turkey, the European Commission of
Human Rights held that, although the European Convention did not
explicitly demand that emergency derogations be officially declared,
'article 15 requires some formal and public act of derogation, such as a
declaration of martial law or state of emergency, and that, where no such
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act has been proclaimed[... ] art. 15 cannot apply.' 86 Such insistence on the
importance of declarations once again begs the question. If formal
declarations are so critical when governments decide to bring about states
of emergency in response to actual emergencies, don't we have here a
distinct mark of 'the public'? It is certainly true that, as it is understood by
theorists and lawmakers, the declaration requirement applies to
governments who face emergencies and not to ordinary individuals. In that
sense, it is a distinctively public requirement. However, it is also true that
governments can often address public emergencies-i.e. emergencies that
affect the provision of public goods-within the parameters of the
ordinary legal order, without having to declare and implement any special
state of emergency or emergency derogations. Thus, the declaration
requirement marks a distinct sub-group of public emergencies. The real
underlying question is why such a sub-group should be singled out and
subjected to special formalities.
The general wisdom is that a government must make a special
declaration when, in response to an alleged emergency, it seeks to do what
would be illegal in ordinary times. In such situations, as Oren Gross and
Fionnuala Ni Aolain remark, an 'open acknowledgement and engagement
in public justificatory exercise is a critical component in the moral and
legal choices made by the officials. ' 87 Why is such a move critical in such
situations? Here, it is useful to come back to the idea of ethics of
governance, focusing this time around on the rule of law, which one
author recently described as the 'ethic of civility[ ... ] appropriate for public
life. ' 88 The rule of law is both an ethic of governmental accountability and
an ethic of autonomy. On the one hand, it insists that governments, like
everybody else, must comply with the law of the land and be publicly
accountable for their behaviour in the courts. On the other, it imposes a
series of formal conditions on the law-e.g. clarity, prospectivity,
openness, stability, consistency, generality-that are meant to ensure that
its addressees are capable of being guided by it, and thus that they are able
to conduct their lives around it and avoid the stigma and disruption of the
86
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adverse normative consequences that may follow from its breach. When,
in the face of a public emergency, a government needs to introduce a swift
state of emergency that alters its own normative position as well as that of
the governed, it puts its commitment to accountability and fair notice
under pressure-if it does not outright seek to depart from or suspend the
rule of law. Of course, the rule of law is no absolute, and partial departures
or temporary suspensions may sometimes be justified in the name of other
more pressing values. However, even in extremis, such departures require
governments to, at the very least (and keeping in mind substantive
conditions such as Williams's Basic Legitimation Demand), formally
notify those whose life might suddenly be affected by extraordinary
measures, as well as those who should hold such measures in check.
This rule of law constraint stems from the fact that governments
tend to have the ability to modify normative positions in all-encompassing
ways and alter what rights, duties, powers, permissions, or other
constraints apply to whom and in what circumstances. In other words, the
declaration requirement is a function of governments' practical authority.
The basic assumption is that, as moral agents, governments should strive
to exercise their authority justifiably and that, in the case of the
establishment of states of emergency or other abrupt normative shifts such
as wars, a formal declaration is a precondition for justifiability. The
governed and all relevant organs of government must be aware of the
disruption in a way that creates a formal disincentive to abuse and,
ultimately, stands in the way of a reign of terror. Note here that the fact
that an emergency is public and falls within a government's sphere of
responsibilities generally implies, except perhaps in some cases of private
delegation, that the government bears the burden of justifying any prima
fade wrongs and illegalities perpetrated in the process of addressing it.
However, it is only when the governmental response includes an exercise
of authority that results in abrupt and ordinarily illegal normative changes
that a special declaration must be made. The deeper assumption seems to
be that, in other cases, fuller confonnity with the rule of law ensures at
least basic accountability and formally satisfact01y guidance.
At this point, I am aware that many questions remain unanswered.
For example, to what extent should the declaration and implementation of
a state of emergency be made according to law? How specific should a
formal declaration of emergency be? To what extent, if at all, should it be
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subject to legislative scrutiny, and perhaps most importantly, review by
courts? Given the very real possibility of governmental abuse, how
resolutely should governmental emergency responses come under legal
control and seek to live up to the wider desiderata of the rule of law?
These important questions all belong to a more specific study of the
relationship between public emergencies and the ideal of rule of law, and
are at the centre of a vibrant contemporary debate. 89 I shall say no more
about them here. Note, however, that the issues on which I focused in this
article are antecedent to this and other debates related to the management
of public emergencies. By clarifying key dimensions of their subjectmatter, I hope to have made a valuable, if only embryonic, contribution to
their informed resolution.
Of course, one might object that my analysis of public emergencies
in this article is not 'antecedent' enough to these further debates, given
that it focuses on governments and that public goods-and thus public
emergencies-may exist even in the absence of government. However,
one should not exaggerate the importance of this last objection. Like
Bernard Williams once noted, 'the securing of order, protection, safety,
trust, and the conditions of cooperation' is one of the primary issues-if
not the primary issue-of political theory and the modem state presents
itself as a solution to it, as well as to the securing of many other public
goods. 90 In fact, at this historical juncture, state governance remains the
main purported answer to the provision of public goods, even though state
governments' authority and claims to comprehensiveness are increasingly
being eroded. Hence, my decision to focus primarily on state governance.
Notice, however, that this choice of emphasis does not preclude that other
entities-be they local tribes or the international community-may also
have distinctive duties to answer emergency threats to public goods when
a given state's government fails to do it or is simply inexistent. 91 That said,
a discussion of these sub-state and supra-state emergency dynamics will
have to await another day.
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